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Ultra

--000-Ultra Vires is the term used to designate those acof a corporation beyond the

tions

powers,

express or im-

plied, which are conferred upon it by its charter or the
statutes under which it was

instituted.

Ultra Vires

could not be predicated of a common law corporation;

it was

the original idea that a corporation, subject to the few
formalities prescribed as

cenditions precedent to action,

was endowed with the same rights and

liabilities as

subject to the

same

individuals.

Of course, at first, very few corporations existed

except for municipal and religious
time

to time,

in later years,

purposes, but as from

the institution of corpora-

tions was extended to other and more general

purposes, it

became necessary for the public goodto restrict their
powers

to narrower limits, which was done whenever exped-

cts contrary to these
ctmen
ient, by stat
enacte4
ttuory
len,F
--------------------------------------------------------

4JSee 19 lHen.TVII.c.7, which was aimed at trading corpora-

But it

statutes were mala prohibita, not ultra vires.
impracticable to enact general

soon became

from exercising

corporations

the necessity to

enumerated

certain

restrain became

in

that to mention expressly

forbidden would have occupied entirely too much
At the same time,

space in the statutes.
country and

both in this

in England, commercial activity and gigantic

manufacturing
tions

for

powers,

frequent and arose

so

such diverse and unexpected ways,

what was

laws prohibiting

into being

were calling

enterprises

for every conceivable purpose.

corpora-

A new method of

'governing them was therefore devised-statutes were made
the place of the

to take

tions were

to be

the

Hereafter corpora-

to be statutory creations, and their powers were

limited and prescribed by their charters and the acts

under which they were
sooner

common law.

incorporated.

in America than in England.

case

oflead

v.

The Providence

The change came
As early as
Insurance

1802,

aboit
in

Co..,Chief Juf,-

pounds, the
tions
and prohibited under a penalty of forty
of the
the interest
enactment of by-laws which might affect
crown or the people's good.
P4I2 Cranch,127.

tice Marshall

to

says:"IlWfithout ascribing
is the mere

in its corporate capacity,

its existence-all

to which it owes

abilities annexed by the

this body-which.,

creature of' the act

the qualities and dis-

common law to ancient corporations

of this sdtt, it maV be said to be precisely what
corporating act has made

it, to derive all its

that act and to be capable of exercising its

powers

incorporation

Is an enabling act.

power they possess.
when it prescribes
observe

that

mode,

from

faculties
"With

only in the manner which that act authorizes'.
these bodies which have only a legal

the in-

existence,

the act of

It gives them all the

It enables them to contract, and
to them a mode of contracting, they must
or the

instrument no more creates

a

con-

tract than if the body had never b--en incorporated."
The change

is now complete.

privileges were

At firstwhatever

found inconsistent with

were expressly prohibited by statute.
unauthorized by the real

corporate

the public good
Now whatever is

intent and spirit of the

law cre-

ating the corporation, the courts hold to be impliedly prohibited by the rule of statutory construction.

To these

unauthorized acts the courts give the name of ultra vires.
The doctrine is thus the creature purely of judicial decision, and affords perhaps the most remarkable instance in
the history of English jurisprudence of the making of the
law by the judges.

It was originated by the courts upon

grounds of public policy and commercial necessity and to
meet and provide for circumstances which called for the intervention of some strong hand, but for which the state had
not directly provided.

In New York, however, ultxa ,vires

rests, at present, on a statutory basis.

The doctrine as

enforced through a long line of judicial decisions has been
at last tersely and clearly stated in the Revised Statutes,
wherein it is declared that 'in addition to the powers enumerated,........ and to those given in its charter, or in the
act under which it is or shall be incorporated, no corporation shall possess or exercise any corporate powers, except

such as shall be necessary to the exercise of the powers so

enumerated and given."
It will be seen also from what has been said, that,
the doctrine of ultra vires is of recent origin.

As

used in the discussion of legal subjects, the phrase is
probably first

found in

Lord Kamd's

"Principles of Equity',

His words are,

published originally in 1776.

0A princi-

ple in logics that, will without power cannot produce any
effect, is applicable to matters of law and is thus expressed, that a

deed ultra. vires is null and void.'

Its appearance as a distinct fact and principle in the legal

system of England dates,

Mr.

Brice

tells

us,

from about

the year 1845, though the doctrine was announced from the
bench in America somewhat sooner, owing to the earlier use
of corporations here.

The question first arose in

a

dispute between the shareholders themselves, in an action
by the minority to restrain the majority from engaging in
acts which they claimed to be unauthorized by the charter.

From disputes of this nature the courts went farther to mattere which involved the rights of outsiders, and at last
the doctrine was extended to transactions of every description where doubts could be raised as to the business peculiar to corporations or the special powers, express or implied, belonging to them.
ried to extreme limits,

As a result it has been car-

even as far as to releive a corpor-

ation from a contract of which it
benefit O)

may have had

the full

At the very outset it overturned the old time-

honored maxim of the common law that 'a man cannot stultify
himself', and allowed corporations to plead their own incapacity whenever it was inconvenient for them to carry out
their engagements.

It next came in conflict with the

well established equitable maximsthat 'he who seeks equity
must do equity', and 'he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands', and refused to allow them to be applied
to corporations--a course of reasoning which allowed a
(O)Balfour v. Ernest 5 O.B.N.S. 61, 28 L.J.C.P., "170; Ernest
v. Nicholls, ,6 _H.Lds.-401; Atneneum Life Assurance Co. v.
Pooley 3 D.G.& J. 294, 28 L.J.(Ch.) 119.

corporation to keep the benefits of a contract,
to perform its

part of the a'qreement .

yet refuse

Delay even for a

quarter of a century has been held to be no bar to the plea
of ultra vires

i)

Besides these anomalies, there was the

uncertainty which followed the application of the doctrine
itself, when there were no statutes and no accepted decisions to stand upon.

So much rested with each judge that

it was almost always impossible to predict whether a certain transaction would be held ultra vires or not.

The

reports are full of decisions absolutely irreconcilable,
given upon similar statement of facts.

Such was the

condition and tendency of the law of ultra vires until
within the last few years.

The injustice resulting from

its application, and the confusion of the decisions and
h as
dicta, called down upon it the illwill of almost the entire
A

profession.

Mr. Brice speaks of it as being,

if not an

excrescence upon, a very disturbing element in,the legal
.-----------------------------------------------

(eqSpakman v. Evans E.R. 3 H.Lds. 171.

8

system of the

cious",

country.

an unseemly",

the moral

sense"

etc.

Judges

have called

"an ignoble defence"
But modern judicial

has done away with most of its objectionable
These will

be

noted as we proceed.

it "an ung'ra-

shocking

to

legislation

features.

There are three classes of cases which may be arranged
under the head of Ultra Vires, the principle of classification bninr in the different parties to the suit.

The

first class embraces those cases in which the question
arises on the application of stockholders, or corporators,
to restrain the corporate agents from applying corporate
funds to purposes foreign to the objects of incorporation.
The

second embraces those cases in which the question

arises in an action between the corporation and the other
contracting party to enforce Derformance or recover damages
from the party in default.

The third, embraces those

cases in which proceedings are brought by the sovereign
power to annul the charter for an abuse of the powers
Granted.

These will be considered in their order.

(1.) The principle of majority rule lies at the very
foundation of corporations-the convenience and necessity
of this form of government in large bodies of associated
capitalists is one of the incentives which has led to the

formation of corporate bodies.
the acts of the majority.

The minority is bound by

To this the stockholder consents

by becoming a member of the corporation, because he is presumed to know the law and the rights of the majority by the
law.

But this democratic or representative principle,

fundamental though it is, does not apply to an act or acts
of the majority unauthorized by the charter or constitutional articles of incorporation and inconsistent with the
object and purpose with which the corporation was organized,
The stockholder can not be presumed to have anticipated or
thought that such acts would ever be perpetrated or attempted.

And so courts have always held that a single share

holder can restrain a corporation from diverting the corporate funds from the purposes for which they were originally
intended, and prevent any ultra vires act on the part of
a majority of the shareholders or the agents of the corporation.

The doctrine was first promulgated in America

in 1820 in

Livingston v. Lynch, and again later in 1843

('4/4 Johns. Ch. 57?.

in Hartford & New Haven R.R.Co. v. Oroswell.O

These cases

were the first to establish clearly that any ultra vires
act on the part of the directors or a majority of the stockholders is a breach of contract between the corporation and
each of its shareholders, for which the aggrieved party may
demand redress.
long

This doctrine has been followed by a

line of decisions extending down to the present time.o

Thus a shareholder in a railroad corporation may enjoin the
carrying

out of an ultra vires lease of the roador the

performance of an illegal contract.(d
manufacturin
terin

A stockholder in a

company may object to the corporation's en-

into enterprises different from those originally

contemplated in the charterJO/

A court may interfere at

the suit of a minority when the majority seeks to appropriate the assets of the company or to obtain for themselves
advantages not shared by the minorit.(4f

(aJ5

A majority of the

(0'ee 83 Barb.584 for cases on this point;
Hill 38s.
LaThomas v. R.R.Co., 101 U.S. 71;
also 110 N.Y. 519 at 520.
Troy & Boston PR.Co. v. Boston &c. Pl'way Co., 86 T.Y., 107;
(ajSanford v. R.R.
Mills v. Central PR. Co., 41 N.J.Eq. 1.
(?31 Minn. 140; 93 Blatchf. 517;
Co., 24 Penn.St., 378.
(6J52 Ga.,276.
11 Daly,273.

stockholders can not, as against a dissenting stockholder,
sell out the corporate property wbich i

esgential to the

continuance of the business of the corporation or the payment of the corporate
if

debtsg4a

It is extremely doubtful

a majority can even effect a dissolution unless the cor-

poration is an unprofitable and failing enterprise.d1

A

minority can prevent a consolidation with another corporation, unless the charter expressly confers upon the company the

right to consolidate.&J

suit to compell

resistance on the

to an unjust tax;

A stockholder can bring a
part of the corporation

and to restrain a water company from fur-

nishing water to a city free of charges;

he may brin(i a suit

in behalf of a corporation against an officer of the corporation for fraudulent misappropriation and conversion of
corporate property when the corporation refuses to bring
such action.4f)

------------------------------------------------------

Wibbot v. Am.Hard Rubber Co.,33Barb.578.
(4Lauinan v. Lebanon Valley RR.Co.,SO Pa.$t.,42.
(C2Clinch v. Financial
Corporation,b.R. 5 ER.460 .
1AJDodge v. Woolsey,19 HoW.331o
(CHowes v. Oakland,104 U.S.450.
(f
Graves v. Gouge,69N.Y. 1p

But while it is true as a general rule that a majority,
however large,

can not in an ultra vires act, bind a single

dissenting shareholder, still there are certain exceptions
which are as certain and reliable as the rule itself.
If the shareholder has once ratified the ultra vires act,
or done any thing which amounts to a ratification,

he will

not be allowed thereafter to complain against the corporation.

A shareholder has been refused his remedy on the

ground that his application came too late, his laches having lost him the right he originally possessed.

Fair

dealing and good conscience obviously require the complainants to assert their right at the outset, if it is designed
ever to do so.62Z
tion.

Other acts than delay amount to ratifica-

Where the plaintiff had with full knowledge re-

ceived his

profits as shareholder under

bill afterwards filed was dismissed.h

the agreement, his

But it may be said

that where the legislature has expressly prohibited the do(aErie R'way Co.
(Cb2 Johns.& Hem.

v. D.L.& W.Co.,21 N.J.Eq.,283
80,(2)

to

Ing of an act by an incorporated company, any contract
do it is illegal, and the

fense, though every

in this country.

simply Implie4ly prohibited in the

But where an
charter the

ques-

In the United States, with the

tion is not so clear.
single

Such is

share holder has assentert.&Joj

the rule in England and
act is

illegality may be set up as a de-

exception of Maryland, the doctrine seems

to be

that

such acts may be ratified.(C/

(2.)

The doctrine originally laid down in cases of

this class was this:

all ultra vires contracts, being un-

lawful, are void, and the derense

is available equally to

the corporation and to the other party to the

This was

contract.

so, not because the defense was considered a mer-

itorious one nor from any equity supposed to exist
of the party pleading

it,

in favor

but because the other party was

presumed to have notice of the powers of the corporation

---------------------- -----------------------------------LaL.R.9 'Exch.Ca. 379.
( O 21 How. 441; 8 Gill.,%
J.
248;
(CIComstock's opinion in Bissel v. PR.Co.,
42 Md. 581.
22 N.Y. 289, reo&nied in 63 N.Y. 62.

and the court would not lend

its process or employ Its ma-

chinery in the aid of one who had been equally concerned
with

the corporation In

It was held,

cepts.

opinion in the

the act of disobedience to its pre-

as Judge Selden in his dissenting

case of Bissel

v. RR.Co. shows ana 'bV a long

line of Enqlisb and American citations tries to uphold,
that acts outside the authority given by the corporate
charters were illegal and void, and the broad principle,
that one may always set up the illegality of his own contract in defense of an action upon it, was applied without
limitation to ultra vires acts of corporations.L 1

But it

is along this line of cases that the deviation from the original doctrine is most marked.
The earliest limitation put upon the general rule is
this:-

where the transaction is complete and nothing re-

mains to be done by the party seeking relief, the plea of
ultra vires is not available by the defendant corporation
2)2 N.Y.

258 at 281.

in an action brought against it for nonperformance of its
The first case touching upon this

side of the contract.

point is that of Silver Lake Bank v. North, decided by
Chancellor Kent in 1820I

,)

After stating the defenf.e, he

says: 'If this objection was strictly true in point of fact
I should not readily be disposed to listen to it."

In

Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, Oomstock, C.J., sayg: 'There
is no doubt a principle of the common law, that illegal and

lu

'-eso

by any
Acontractslare void, without beingaexpresslY declared
statute.

But there is also another principle, equally

well ascertained and more beneficial in its results, that
no party shall set up his own illegality or wrong to the
prejudice of an innocent person.

He can set it up when

the legislative power not only forbids to make the contract,
but declares it to be void.

But the logic of the law and

certainly its morality, are not opposed to the doctrine
that the legislature may prohibit the contract and punish

(gJ4 Johns.Ch.

370.

h)

21 N.Y.

490-5.

the guilty parties, and yet leave the contract to stand in
favor of innocent persons not included in the terms of the
In Whitney Arms Company v. Barlowaqhe

prohibitions."

on the doctrine of ultra vires as it stands

leading

case

in this

state to-day, Allen, J.,after

reviewing the case

and conceding that the acts were unauthorized

ter,

says:

'It would

be contrary to the

equity to allow such a defense
the

corporation ........

by the

char-

first principles of

to prevail

in an action by

It is now very well

settlea

that

a corporation can not avail itself of the defense, when
the contract has been in good faith fully performed by

the

other partV and the corporation has had the full benefit of
the performance and of the contract.

If an action can

not be brought directly upon the agreement, either equity
will grant relief, or an action in some other

vail . ............
general

rule,

The plea of ultra. vires should not, as a

prevail, whether interposed for or against a

eorporation, when it would not advance
(")6-N.Y. 62.

form will pr-

justice, but, on the

contrary, would accomplish a legal wrong.*
has ben repeatedly cited

exact words
v. Poach.)

in the

later New York cases-the

last quoted being used in the Rider Raft Co.
The doctrine

is

followed also in Woodruff v.

Erie R'way Coi.band in several
Jourdan v. Long
forth says:

This opinion

supreme court cases.(C)

Island RP.Co.,

decided

in

In

1889, Judge Dan-

"Moreover the defendant received a pecuniary

benefit under the contract, upon the assumption that the

contract was valid.
was

If they intended to disavow it,

there duty to be active in so doing and not remain will-

fully passive in

order to profit by an omission or mistake

on the Part of their own officers .
say 'I have got all
repudiate the mutual

and

it

I bargained

.......

for',

One party cannot

and without liability

obligation which enabled it to do so,

formed the consideration of the bargain.

was the consideration for

One promise

the other, and together

stituted a binding agreement."

they con-

The older New York cases

--------------------------------------------- ------------(a97 N.Y. 378.
4) 93 N.Y. 609.
Q/Rome Savings Bank
v. Kramer 32 Hun. 270; Negley v. Counting Room Co.,1 N.Y.S.R
298; Watts Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 21 N.Y.S.R,. 136.
/t1l5 N.Y. 380

hold to

In Parish v. Wheeler1Com-

same doctrine.

the

stock, C.J.,

says

that

tions must be allowed

'the executed dealings

of corpora-

to stand for and against both parties,

when the plainest ruies of good faith require

it.'

In

Palmer v. LawrenceJudge Duet lays down the proposition in
still more
Weed is

comprehensive

to the

terms.

Steam Navigation Co.

same effect.k! In most of the other

the same view is taken.L(Z)

In

v.

states

Oil Creek & Alleahanv River

Co. v. Pa. Trans. Cd., Paxom, J.,

said:

'We do not think

the defendants are in a position to defend upon the ground
of illegality of the

enants

and mutual

contract.

advantagfes.

There were mutual

The defendants

ed the advantages such as they were.

the demand

had

bad grace from the defendants.

enjoy-

To the extent of

in this suit the contract was executed,

say now that it was ultra vires,

cov-

and to

comes with an exceedingly
It may be

that having

378.
(CVe Hill
6b) 3 Sanf. 161.
C4)22 N.Y. 494.
(AJ13 Gray 124; 2 Stock (N.J.) 177; 16 Mass. 94; 30 Pa.St.20s;
3 Oregon 189; 55 Mo. 233; 44 Iowa 239; 11 Wall. 459; 12 Wall.
Ce) 83 Pa.St. 160.
358.

shown performance on their part, they would have a right
to rescind the contract as to
Ground of its illegality.
But there

opinion.

is

future transactions upon the
Upon that point we

no rule

of law which

express no

permits

them

to retain both the benefits and the price."

It will

be seen from these decisions that it is the
entered upon and

general

rule that a corporation which has

enjoyed

the benefit

can not

thereafter interpose the plea of ultra vires when

contract

for a

contract.AI! Still there

sued upon the

this general

ot a

statement.

corporationl is at all
charter and powers

long period of time

is one

exception to

The party contracting. with &

times presumed to have notice of the

of the corporation.

When, therefore,

the nature of the act to be performed is such that it is
manifesti,

can not

on Its face,

unauthorized by the charter, he

of an ultra vires act
enforce performanceA by the corporation, even though

he has himself performed his covenant.

In such a case

plea of ultra vires by the corporation will prevail.
(/42

Hun., 496.

the

He

to be

is considered
itself and
in

which

the

law will

found

it

in pari deZicto with the corporation
leave him in the

same condition

him.(6)

And it makes no difference whether the defence

of

ultra vires is set up by the corporation itself, or by

other contracting

party.

The party contracting with the

corporation has recognized its
to contract, and has
inq,

the

existence and its capacity

thereby estopped himself from assert-

in his own behalf, the

inability of the corporation

to enter into the contract to which he voluntarily became
a party.OJ
as being

In Whitney Arms Company v. Barlow, cited above

the

leading

the judge says:

case on the doctrine of ultra vires,

OHe who has

received from a corporation

the full consideration of his engagement to pay money

either

the

in services or in property,

cannot avail himself of

objection that the contract thus

fully performed by the

----------------------------------------------------------( 2)lexander v. Cauldwell, 88 N.Y. 480; Conselvea v. Blanchard 103 N.Y. 222; Jamieson v. Citizens' Savinas Bank,
(b) Worcestor Medical Institute v. Harding
44 Hun.412.
i Cush.,285; Cochran v. Arnold 58 Pa.St.,399; Black River
?, Utica RP..Co. v. Clarke 25 N.Y.,208; 62 Mo.,247; 57 Ind.60,

corporation was ultra vires . .......

If the other party

has had the benefit of a contract fully performed by the
corporation, he will not be beard to object that the contract and performance were not within the legitimate powers of the corporation."

This case was cited as decisive

of a similar point raised in the Diamond Match Company v.
Poeber, decided in 1887,

and is the generally accepted doc-

trine throughout the country.@i
But there is :till a class of cases which comes under
this head, in which either party may always make use of the
plea of ultra vires.

This class embraces actions upon con-

tracts purely executory on both sides.
Company v. Barlow, cited above,

In Whitney Arms

the court says:

"Did the

question now made arise upon an application bV the stockbold.rs and corporators to restrain the corporate aqents
from applyingf corporate funds to purposes foreign to the
corporationror enqaqing in business outside of that for
which the company was formed, or on proceedings by the
--------------------------------------------------------

LcZ}106 W.Y.,q47S.

sovereign power to annul
powers granted,

the charter

of the

for an abuse

or in a proceeding to enforce

and foe the

performance of an 6xecutory contract, where, upon recision or annulling the agreement, both parties would have
the

same position as

if

no

the

contract had been made,

rules of decision would be different from those which must
prevail

in the present action..

suggested
to give

it

cases

In either of the

is very likely the courts would be compelled

full effect

to the

objection and hold the business

unauthorized and a violation of the charter, and a forfeiture of the chartered rights and the contract null,

refuse

to

perform it

or give

effect

to it."

In Bradley v. Ballard;ustice Laurence says:
said by counsel
estooped to

saF,

and

'It is

for complainant, that a corporation is not
in

its defence, that it had not

the power

to make a contract sought to be enforced against it,

for

the reason that if thus estopped, its powers might be indefinitely
,Aj55 Ill.

enlarged.
,413.

While

the

contract

remains

unexecuted

on both sides

this

is undoubtedly true,

cover of this principle,

a corporation seeks

ment of borrowed money, ....... it is
of ultra vires
In

Thompson v.

more

ultra vires

court states

the

His words are:

stronalvj")

pressing

to evade paythe doctrine

that can never be tolerated.,

to an extent
Lambert,

but when, under

prevails in full

the doctrine

'As we understand

the

still
rule,

force only where the contracts

0
of corporations of this character remain wholly executory.

There

is another tendency of the courts which has had
of

the effect of limiting the application of the doctrine
ultra vires

in this class of cases, -it

is seen in the

greater liberality employed in behalf of the

corporation

in the interpretation of the charter and the enabling acts.
Not only ar( corporations allowed all powers given by the
charter, but the power to make all
necessary and usual

in the

such contracts as are

course of business, or are

sonably incident to the objects

rea-

for which a private corpor-

&tion is created is implied, where there is no positive
------------------------------------------------------ ---

(aZJ44

Iowa 239.

Thus a corporation may lease

restriction in the charter.
or mortgage

n(eded

and not immediately
poration

charter,

property lawfully held by it under its

-. stablished

for its

for the

business.tO)A

own

purpos

o'

cor-

manufacturing

and

seilling glass may contract to purchase glassware to keep
up its

own stock and

is underqoina
for

dams

supply customers while its

repairs.J)A corporation authorized

the purpose

of holding water

power,

real estate when the water power has been
guished, and as part of the contract agree
grade

factory

of the lands sold..4

to erect

may sell

its

legally extinto

raise the

A railroad corporation may agree

to transport as a common carrier over connecting lines,
goods

A

entrusted to it for carriage over its own line.

/

corporation with the power of 'discounting" paper, may

go

into the market and buy negotiable

instruments at less

than face value.bJ These and many other

the

courts have allowed

L/131 Mass.,271.

implied powers

to corporations, and this tendency

C,5Atlantic

Bank &c.

v.

Savery 82 N.Y.291.

to

read into the

be

of use

to

charter every power wbich could possibly

the corporation has very considerably lessen-

ed the numbr of ultra vires cases

(S.)

much miqht be

take

to

Concerning action, brought by the state

granted

to a corporation in its

char-

said, but

the subject can only be

touched

away the privileges
ter

in the courts.

upon lightly here.
The idea

a

that

corporation may be disolved

It was

familiar to English law from the earliest times.
a common occurence during
and

succeeding

the

reigns

the

reign of' Edward

for proce edings

corporations

by the

crown against

chises

or arTainst individuals

Looking at the English reports
one would be

forfeiture

quo ioarrato,

to be

such

instituted
their

fran-

privileges.

in the time of' Richard III.,

led to believe that a good part of his reign

was devoted to
a

the First

for misusing

for usurping

been

has

contests of this sort.

of a franchise was

The manner in which

enforced was by a writ of

which gradually went out of use and an infor-

mation

in

of a quo zoarran to,

the nature

at the suit

This

lkttornev-general was substituted in its place.
ter proceeding

is still

use

in

of the
lat-

states, but

in many of the

in New York it has been abolished and superseded by a regular code action.

The
ity

to

right of a corporation to exist, and its authorfor which it was instituted

conduct the business

are granted subject to the

conditions that the

privileges

and franchises conferred upon it shall not be abused or
so employed

as

to defeat

the

ends of incorporation.

When

so abused or misemployed, the state may withdraw or reclaim
the privileges granted.
pressly stated
ily

Although no such condition be

in the charter, nevertheless

ex-

it is necessar-

implied with every grant of corporate powers.

Broadly stated

brought by
But as

this is

the state to annul

to what constitutes

forfeiture

the basis of all actions

the

sufficient

charter of a corporations
misuser to warrant

the courts do not always agree.

a

As a general

rule it

may be said that there must be wilful abuse or im-

proper neglect.

Usually something more than mere acciden-

tal negligence or mistake in the mode of' exercising a power
is necessary.

If, however, it is a material act, in con-

nection with which neglect is alleged, bad or corrupt motives need not be Dresent;

it is sufficient if there is

neglect alone.ia') At the same time a substantial
ance of the requirements of the chart)r is all
quired.,ZJ The courts will not,

performthat is re-

where a franchise has been

fairly and expressly granted, resort to narrow or forced
constructions, in order to establish a forfeiture, but any
material deviation may be fatal.tJ A bank failing to redeem
its notes which it has put into circulation forfeits its
charter.

A hospital which, under a prior a-reement, used

part of an appropriation from the state to compensate an
attorney for superintending the bill through the legislature was held guilty of such an abuse of its powers as to
(4!Peo. v. Kingston Arc.Turnpike Co. 23 Wend.,193.
tiPeo. v. Broadwvay Rl.Co. 56 Hun.,45.

O-4--+.

of its

forfitiire

warrant a

so much of its

corporate

ment of' debts as

iness,

charter.(a2A

property to

to prevent the

forfeits its charter.&)b

Bank which assigns

trustees

for thr! pay-

resumption of banking bus-

A manufacturing corporation
and individuals

entered

into

which with other

corDorations

and gave control

of the business to a trust association in

order to prevent competition and raise

the price of its

products was dissolved in an action brought

state.(e,

pose by the
feiture,

the

is necessary.

forfeiture

But misuser itself will not work a for-

regular decree
It is well

can-not arise

N.Y.Elevated
ure cannot be

PR.Co.,

for that pur-

of a court having

settled also that questions of

collaterally.

Earle,

jurisdiction

J.,

says:

In the matter of
"A cause

of forfeit-

taken advantage of or enforced against a cor-

poration collaterally, or incidentally, or in any other
mode

than by a direct proceeding for that purpose against

the corporation.'A

-----------------------------------------------------------CaJPeo. v. Dispensary cr Hospital Soc.&c.,17 Lansing 304.
L4)Peo. V. President &C. of Bank of Hudson, 6 Cawan, 217.
(CJPeo. v. North. River Sugar Refining Co. 54 Hun.,354.
3-7-8 .
aQ70 NT.Y.
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Whether the stato must prove actual
a question on which

injury or not is

the cases are not uniform.d The better

doctrine and that prevailing in New York is
must prove

damages.

burgh Turnpike

Co.,

Judge Papallo,
sIys:

the

sential an ingredient to
tion

from the

"Injury to

state

v. Williams-

the public

is as

es-

right of action as the devia-

statute.'"&)

From this short and

rather hasty review of the cases

on ultra vires, we may deduct these

(1) That a single shareholder,

holders,

in Peo.

that the

three propositions:

or a minority of share-

can restrain the corporation from commiting any

ultra vires act, unless

there has been an express or im-

plied acquiescence on the part of the complaining party.
(2) That in contracts between the

corporation and other

parties the plea of ultra vires is available only when the
contract is

executory on both

sids---subject to the single

taVCommercial Bank v. State,6 Smedes &i Marsh (Miss.)
(ca peo. v. iTilliamsburqh Turnpike Co.47 N.Y.,586.
'_J47 N.Y.,595.

59;

exception that the other party can not plead the incapacity
of the corporation in his own behalf where the nature of
the contract is such, on its face,

that he might have known

that it was unauthorized under the charter, the terms of
which he is at all times presumed to know.
(,) That the state,

for any material and damaging vari-

ation on the part of the corporation from the powers given,
may revoke its grant and annul the charter.

